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| Nuclear-armed submarines in Haifa | ||||
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Israel has 3 submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The submarines were built in Germany, and all three were delivered in 1998-1999. The price of each submarine is about $320 million, with Germany building two of the submarines at its own expense. In mid-2006 two more submarines were ordered, bringing the total to 5 submarines. The cost of the two additional submarines is estimated at $1.3 billion, of which Germany will finance a third. Therefore the cost of the entire nuclear submarine project for Israel is more than a billion dollars (not including maintenance costs). The new submarines are to be delivered to Israel by 2010. Apparently Israel ordered Dolphin 800 conventional submarines, powered by diesel engines. In practice, Israel asked to change the technical specification so that instead of 10 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber in each submarine, four of the tubes would be 650 mm - an unusual step that required redesigning the submarine from this model. Commentators around the world estimated that this substantial change would allow the submarines to carry missiles with nuclear warheads.
The submarines carrying nuclear weapons are moored at the navy base in the port of Haifa. There has never been a public debate on whether the residents of Haifa (about a quarter of a million people) and the residents of the Krayot (about a quarter of a million people) agree that submarines carrying atomic weapons will be moored in the port of their city. There is no information accessible to the public about the transport and maintenance of radioactive weapons to a port near which half a million residents live. No democratic debate was held on the consequences and implications of the transition from an ordinary military port to a port where submarines carrying unconventional weapons are moored. Such a transition requires, for example, monitoring the radiation level in the water and on the bathing beaches. It requires, for example, preparing the population for the case of a malfunction in one of the submarines. Even if some body collects this information and prepares scenarios, this is not done by an independent civilian public body that provides reliable and accessible information to all residents. This concerns health, ecological, economic and even strategic information for the 500,000 residents of Haifa and its surroundings. Even if it is claimed that the submarines are not armed in peacetime, it is unlikely that Israel invested more than a billion dollars just for an emergency, while not arming the submarines and conducting exercises. Recently the press reported that, under a veil of secrecy, the navy is about to build a giant structure in the military port of Haifa. The structure, 25 metres high and 150 metres long, is being built contrary to the national master plan. That is, once again, without public and democratic debate. The secrecy around the construction of the giant structure in the navy's port is linked to another secret navy project - the submarines with nuclear capability. In particular, the purchase of two additional submarines does require building a berth for the new submarines (if they are indeed to be moored in Haifa and a submarine berth is not built in another navy port - like the one in Eilat). Why does Israel invest billions of shekels in building a fleet of submarines with nuclear capability? Israel already has ballistic missiles with nuclear, chemical and biological warheads, covering most of the Arab capitals bordering Israel: Damascus is about 200 km away, Amman about 70 km away, Cairo 400 km away - as is the Aswan Dam, which is a target for attack. The Jericho 1 and Jericho 2 missiles, with ranges of 500 km and about 1,300 km respectively, cover most of these areas. The question arises why Israel needs submarines with nuclear missiles able to cover all the ports of the Middle East. One possible answer is Israel's intention to attack states of the second circle, which do not border Israel - first and foremost Iran, whose nearest border is more than 1,000 km away (Tehran is about 1,500 km from Israel). Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia, is 1,500 km from Israel and therefore outside the range of the missiles. Tripoli, the capital of Libya, is also beyond the reach of Israeli missiles - 2,100 km away. Nuclear submarines allow Israel to patrol the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and even the Indian Ocean, and to strike targets in Iran, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, for example.
In order to attack Iran, the submarines must sail, as noted, into the Indian Ocean. This is not simple when sailing from
the port of Haifa. Such a journey around Gibraltar can total 20,000 km - if one wants to avoid passing through the Gulf of
Suez, controlled by Egypt, and from there into the Red Sea. According to unverified estimates, Israel has secretly set up a
submarine berthing facility also in the port of Eilat. Even if this information is unverified, it makes sense that Israel
would do so (if it has not already done so) if it intends to attack Iran from the sea. Residents of Eilat too have not been
given any information on this matter, and no public and democratic debate was held on the consequences as they apply to the
residents of Haifa.
Sailing to the Indian Ocean, as noted, is not a simple mission, particularly since there are no ports for refueling and for supplying water and food. Sailing from Eilat to the Indian Ocean requires passing along the coasts of Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Oman - states with no military ties to Israel. On the other hand, Eritrea's name appears in various reports as a possible country that provides Israel with a base for refueling the submarines on the way to the Persian Gulf. Another country with military ties to Israel that lies on the Indian Ocean coast is India. In recent years the military ties between the two countries have tightened, and it is not impossible that India provides a berth for Israel's nuclear submarines on their way to the islands off Iran. Another alternative could be an escort ship cruising at some distance from the submarine at all times, supplying it with fuel, food and water, with a floating workshop for repairs and perhaps even a rotating crew of sailors. In addition, there are estimates that Israel has secretly increased the fuel capacity of the submarines in order to give them a greater cruising range. In the fictional book "Diplomacy in the Depths of the Sea" by former navy commander Shlomo Erel, he describes how an Israeli submarine is transferred towards the Persian Gulf, disguised as a Zim cargo ship specially converted for the purpose. The ship sails from Haifa through Suez towards the Indian Ocean without arousing any suspicion, and lowers the submarine not far from the coasts of Iran. The Indian Ocean has already served Israel as a testing ground for its navy. On 13 May 2000 a test was held off the coast of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, in which two Israeli submarines took part. In the test, Popeye cruise missiles (manufactured by Rafael) were fired at dummy targets at a distance of 1,500 km in the depths of the Indian Ocean. This came after Israel, on 4 May 2000, renewed relations with Sri Lanka (and began supplying it with Kfir aircraft). According to reports, the Popeye missiles that were fired are capable of carrying warheads containing 6 kg of plutonium. The choice of the Indian Ocean for the test was made after, on 6 April 2000, a Jericho missile tested in the Mediterranean missed a US Navy ship named Anzio, landing 25-40 nautical miles (45-75 km) from the ship. The US then expressed sharp protest to Israel. In October 2003, senior officials in Israel and the US government confirmed, on condition that they not be quoted, that Israel had succeeded in adapting American Harpoon missiles to carry nuclear warheads for the submarines in its possession - missiles that the US supplies to Israel. During the Cold War, nuclear submarines of the USSR and the USA were part of the "second strike" doctrine. This meant that even if one side succeeded in destroying all the nuclear strike capability of the other side, its nuclear submarines cruising across the globe would be able to strike back with a second blow. This assumption was based on the fact that both countries have vast territories and hundreds of millions of residents, and that a hit on army bases is not necessarily a hit on the entire population.
Not so Israel. What point would there be in launching a second counterstrike if an atomic bomb hit one of Israel's population
centers? Specifications:
Dolphin 800 submarine
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