The decision to produce nuclear weapons in Israel was made by one man, David Ben-Gurion, and there was never a democratic public debate on whether Israel really needed atomic bombs. Such a debate never took place in the government, let alone in the Knesset. In fact, the decision was made in a way that contradicts every democratic principle; Ben-Gurion even lied about this to members of government from his own party, to the Knesset and, finally, to the public in a speech he delivered. The enormous budgets for the project came from outside the state budget.

The decision to produce atomic weapons created a problem for its makers: how to carry out a project that had been adopted in an anti-democratic way, within a society and within systems whose patterns are democratic. How to prevent any democratic debate, since its results could overturn the decision to produce atomic weapons.

In order to prevent debate on whether Israel needs atomic bombs, a body was set up that in time became Malmab, the Security Officer of the Defence Establishment. The way to prevent such a debate was to control the information and the details, by mobilizing secrecy, ambiguity and "state security". Without details and without information there is no way to hold such a democratic debate, because what would there be to discuss? And in the absence of democratic debate, no "danger" to the project is seen.

From its founding, Malmab's role was to keep information from Israel's own citizens. It had no control - and still has none - over information published around the world about what is happening in the nuclear field in Israel. For example, as early as December 1960 the New York Times published on its front page that Israel was developing an atomic bomb, and a week earlier the Time magazine had written about it. The information was also withheld from individuals within the system who opposed the project and therefore threatened its progress (see the case of Isser Harel below).

For years it was easy to keep millions of Israeli citizens in the dark about what was being done in the back yard of their home, while a great deal of information about it was being published abroad. This was called ambiguity. The methods for this varied: from using military censorship against the local press and literature, through gag orders and the continued use of intimidation against journalists and public figures, all the way to kidnappings and personal persecution.

The journalists Gideon Alon and Ronen Bergman, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Yaakov, Mordechai Vanunu, Dr. Avner Cohen and Prof. Uzi Even are a partial list of people who felt the weight of Malmab's hand because they sought to hold some public debate on what was happening in the nuclear field in Israel. Yitzhak Yaakov (Yitzhe) was suspected of espionage and treason after he showed a journalist and several of his friends a manuscript of two memoirs he intended to publish with the censor's approval. This was after he had spent more than 25 years in the establishment, from 1948 until the Yom Kippur War, and had even founded the army's research and development department. But since then, and for more than 25 years, he had been cut off from what was going on in that establishment. Yaakov gave an interview to Ronen Bergman of Yedioth Ahronoth, who submitted it to the censor (an interview that was never published). The military censor, abusing his position, passed the interview on to Malmab. From here, Malmab's actions against Brig. Gen. Yaakov included the following steps: arrest and interrogation for a month without the ability to see a judge or a lawyer, and with no one knowing about his arrest (a kidnapping). In addition, an indictment for serious espionage (treason) that in effect ended in an acquittal; house arrest for more than a year, which cost the taxpayer about NIS 1.5 million; and a worsening of Yaakov's health, as he is a heart patient and has diabetes. At the end of the trial, after Malmab's campaign of persecution, the state was ordered to pay Brig. Gen. Yaakov legal fees of NIS 120,000. During this time, journalist Ronen Bergman, who was suspected of espionage, was also placed under surveillance - no small matter when it concerns a journalist in a democratic state. There is not enough space here to recount the litany of humiliations and suffering Yaakov went through. This is how Malmab saw him: "a dangerous man", who "transmitted secret information with the intention of harming state security", charged with serious espionage.

Dr. Avner Cohen wrote a book in the US about Israel's nuclear project from the 1950s until 1967 - "Israel and the Bomb" - a book that relied solely on public material, on declassified documents held in archives in the United States and Israel, and on interviews with various figures. In 1993 Cohen submitted an article to the censor in Israel as part of his work. The article was rejected in full, without a reason given. The grounds for rejection, like the article itself, were defined as a state secret. After Malmab learned that Dr. Cohen was researching the nuclear history of Israel, Israeli agents in the US were activated to follow his academic work and his progress in the research (a detail that became known later). Cohen decided to publish the book in English in the US, and in 1998 it was published. When Dr. Cohen returned to Israel in March 2001, he was summoned for questioning at the Malmab offices in the Kirya in Tel Aviv on suspicion of espionage. Malmab accused him of publishing a secret report. When Dr. Cohen tried to find out how a person in Israel can know what is defined as secret, he was told that this information too is secret, and that a person who is not authorized has no way of knowing. Years later the investigation file was closed. The book came out in Hebrew two years after the English edition. It was Malmab that dragged its feet in trying to block the publication of Cohen's second book, "The Last Taboo".

Formally, Malmab is responsible for the physical security of Israel's defence installations, for identifying the gaps through which secret information may leak, for investigating suspected defence leaks, and for vetting the reliability and security clearance of employees in the defence establishment. In practice, as noted, its role is to protect the nuclear project by silencing democratic debate (activity defined as espionage is handled by the Shin Bet and the police). Because the establishment and operation of Malmab itself were carried out in violation of all democratic rules, the very fact of its existence became highly classified, and for decades military censorship prevented any publication about the existence of a body called Malmab. Even after its existence became known, its activity remained obscure, and the publication of the name and picture of the person heading it was prohibited.

The history of Malmab is the history of Israel's nuclear project. In 1955 a body was set up that was responsible for security in the Ministry of Defence. The body was subordinate to the Shin Bet and was headed by Avraham Niv. A year later he retired and was replaced by his assistant, Haim Carmon, who served in the post of guardian of the nuclear seal for about a decade. When it became known that the head of the Mossad, Isser Harel, opposed building nuclear weapons in Israel, it was Carmon and his office that kept him out of information on the subject. The body Carmon headed went through several incarnations and names. Among others it was called "Special Projects" and "the Office for Special Tasks", and later "the Bureau for Scientific Relations" (Lekem). In the mid-1970s the powers of the security officer were extended to the entire defence establishment, and so Malmab was created. In 1986 Carmon retired and was replaced as head of Malmab by Yehiel Horev. In July 2007 Horev was replaced by Amir Keen.

According to the newspaper Haaretz, Amir Keen is 49 years old. In his youth he was in the Bnei Akiva youth movement and served in the Golani Brigade. After studying geography and the Land of Israel at Bar-Ilan University, about 20 years ago he joined the Ministry of Defence. He joined Malmab and worked in the fields of information security and the security of the foreign relations of the Ministry of Defence and of the defence industries. He spent four years as the Ministry of Defence representative in Australia.

The legality of the organization is in doubt, and apparently its activities and powers were never regulated by law. Information about its role and budgets is suppressed and is not accessible to the public.

Sources:

All the information was taken from open sources and has been published many times over

 

On the attitude of Malmab and the censor towards Avner Cohen, a passage from the book published on the Hagada HaSmalit website can be found: "The author as an example: Section 113(c)".